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JUDICIAL MISAPPLICATION OF STATE OF MIND
DISCOVERY IN MEDIA LIBEL CASES: THE ACTUAL
MALICE STANDARD BETRAYED
I. INTRODUCTION
Defamation law developed over the past six centuries as a
means of protecting individuals from unjustified attacks on their rep-
utations.1 The law of defamation slowly evolved into a highly com-
plex set of rules, as it travelled from English seignorial courts, to
ecclesiastical courts and the Star Chamber, and finally into common
law courts.2 Common law defamation eventually crossed the Atlantic
Ocean with the colonists and made its way into the United States. In
America, defamation law has always been within the province of
state courts.3
One form of defamation law is libel. Libel law protects individ-
uals from unjustified written attacks upon their reputations. 4 Several
different types of libel suits currently exist. For instance, there are
suits between government officials and media defendants,5 govern-
ment officials and non-media defendants, famous people and media
defendants, famous people and non-media defendants, private indi-
viduals and media defendants, and private individuals and non-me-
dia defendants.
At common law, the strict liability standard of proof applied in
all libel cases, regardless of the status of the plaintiff or the category
of the defendant.' Today, different standards apply depending upon
who is the plaintiff.
The courts devised these differing standards in reaction to the
major tensions that run through American libel law. One tension
exists between preserving the constitutional protections of the first
0 1986 by John T. Schreiber
1. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REv. 1349, 1350-52 (1975) [hereinafter cited
as Eaton].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. See infra note 19.
5. A media defendant is one who is involved with press, radio, or television. See RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580A (1977).
6. See infra note 24.
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amendment rights of free speech and press, and accomodating the
state interest in protecting its citizens' reputations.7 Another tension
exists regarding the amount of protection that should be available to
protect the reputations of individuals in the "public eye" as opposed
to ordinary citizens. These conflicts have long existed in the law of
defamation and continue to exist today. These competing interests
are especially acute when the defendant is a member of the media.'
However, until 1964, American jurisdictions applied common law
principles to libel cases including those involving media defendants.
The result was that media defendants received no constitutional pro-
tection in defamation cases.
In 1964, the Supreme Court created a constitutional privilege
for media defendants in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.9 The New
York Times Court held that in cases involving a public official plain-
tiff'0 and a media defendant, the public official may recover for a
defamatory falsehood related to his official conduct only if he proves
that the media defendant made the statement with actual malice."
The Court defined actual malice as knowledge that a statement is
false or reckless disregard of whether it is true or false."2 This stan-
dard relieves the media defendant from having to prove the truth of
all the facts of a statement. In 1968, the Court defined actual malice
as a subjective standard, a harder standard to prove, in order to fur-
ther protect first amendment guarantees of free speech and press.'
Over the next eighteen years, the Court extended this media protec-
tion by holding that various classes of plaintiffs had to prove actual
malice before a media defendant would be liable."
7. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270-73 (1964) (protection
of first amendment values); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974) (protection
of state interest); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 148 (1967) (statement of com-
peting interests).
8. These interests are particularly critical in such situations because the media is greatly
responsible for disseminating information to the public and thereby generating public debate.
9. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
10. A public official may be defined as a government employee who has, or appears to
have, substantial responsibility for, or control over conduct of government affairs. The position
must also be one which would invite public scrutiny of the person holding it, apart from
scrutiny generated by the controversy. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §580A comment b
(1977).
11. 376 U.S. at 279-80.
12. Id. at 280. In other words, a media defendant will not be liable for publishing a
false statement unless actual malice can be proven. Id.
13. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1968).
14. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (extension of actual malice
standard to public figure plaintiffs); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29 (1971)
(New York Times standard extended to matters that are of public interest, even if plaintiff is a
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In its attempt to balance the constitutional and state interests,
however, the Supreme Court created a potentially dangerous imbal-
ance. The original purpose for adopting the subjective standard of
actual malice was to safeguard first amendment concerns.16 T'he cur-
rent Supreme Court has distorted this purpose by using it to allow
"state of mind discovery '"16 into the editorial process."7 Unfortu-
nately, such uninhibited discovery inhibits the media's exercise of its
first amendment rights. Unlimited state of mind discovery is particu-
larly dangerous because the courts give wide latitude to the parties in
discovery, requiring only that relevant evidence be obtained." It is
necessary in media libel cases to establish consistent guidelines, in-
cluding standards of proof and pretrial discovery. Consistency is vital
to these cases because of the constitutional implications involved.
However, because trial judges may differ in their opinion regarding
what constitutes "relevant" evidence, consistent application of the
relevance standard is an elusive goal.
This comment will first discuss the development of libel law
with a focus on the law as it relates to media defendants. The Su-
preme Court's current use of the actual malice standard, which
seems to contradict the original purpose of the standard, will then be
examined. The comment will then discuss the result of this misappli-
cation of the standard: the lack of guidelines to pretrial discovery in
private figure); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (distinction between public
figures who must prove actual malice and private figures who must prove at least negligence);
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (allowing state of mind discovery of the editorial
process); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985) (recovery of
presumed and punitive damages permitted for proof of less than actual malice where the de-
famatory statements do not involve matters of public concern); Philadelphia Newspapers v.
Hepps, 54 U.S.L.W. 4373 (1986) (private figure plaintiffs must show statements are false
when statements are a matter of public concern).
15. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279-80; Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 162 (Warren,
C.J., concurring); St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731-32; Time, Inc. v. Pape, 40 U.S. 279, 290-91(1971); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-41; Herbert, 441 U.S. at 159.
16. State of mind discovery is defined as discovery into the state of mind of the defendant
at the time he made the decision to publish the defamatory statement.
17. Herbert, 441 U.S. 153 (1979). The Court in Herbert provides no definition of the
editorial process. The questions that the defendant Lando objected to, however, provide infor-
mation as to what the process entails. See infra note 53. Logically the process would involve
those measures used to prepare an article or broadcast for publication. See also Hunter, Edito-
rial Privilege and the Scope of Discovery in Sullivan-Rule Libel Actions, 67 Ky. L. J. 787(1979) (the article discusses Herbert v. Lando, supports the Court's holding and provides fur-
ther relevance guidelines for trial courts in public figure libel cases).
18. See FFvn. R. Civ. P. 26(b), which allows discovery of any matter "relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action" if it would either be admissible in evidence or
"appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." Herbert, 441
U.S. at 157.
1986]
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media libel cases and the resultant danger to the media's continued
exercise of its first amendment rights.
The author will then present two proposals which would assure
consistent discovery guidelines and limit the possibility of judges mis-
takenly abusing the actual malice standard by employing lax notions
of relevancy. The first proposal re-emphasizes the use of objective
evidence to prove actual malice. The second proposal creates a lim-
ited discovery privilege for the editorial process in order to protect
first amendment concerns.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF DEFAMATION AND LIBEL
LAW
A. Traditional Approach
There are two forms of defamation: libel and slander. 9 At com-
mon law, libel was defined as a written statement made in public
which was intended to injure the reputation of another by exposing
him to hatred, contempt, or ridicule. 20 Libel is now defined as a
written statement or communication that tends to harm the reputa-
tion of another in the eyes of the community or to deter third parties
from associating or dealing with that person. 2 The purpose of libel
law is to protect citizens' reputations from groundless written
attacks."'
In common law defamation suits, strict liability was the appli-
cable standard.2" The plaintiff established his prima facie case by
entering the allegedly defamatory statement into evidence and then
proving that the defendant made the statement."4 If the plaintiff met
this light burden of proof, the defendant could only escape liability
by proving the truth of the communication or by asserting a recog-
19. Slander differs from libel in that slander is an oral statement while libel is a written
statement. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 568(2) (1977). A discussion of slander is
beyond the scope of this comment.
20. Parmiter v. Coupland, 151 Eng. Rep. 340, 342 (1842) (setting forth the traditional
common law definition of libel).
21. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 559, 563(1) (1977). See also 50 AM. JUR.
2D Libel and Slander § 3 (1970).
22. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
23. Eaton, supra note 1, at 1353.
24. Id. The plaintiff was not required to prove that the statement was false, that the
defendant knew it was false, or that the defendant would have discovered it to be false in the
exercise of reasonable care. The plaintiff did not even have to prove that he suffered any actual
injury to his reputation as a result of the defamatory statement. Injury to reputation was
irrebuttably presumed as a matter of law, and the plaintiff was given the benefit of a rebutta-
ble presumption that the statement was false. Id.
[Vol. 26
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nized privilege.2 5
Until 1964, the Supreme Court left the formulation of libel law
to the states. Although the Court held that the first amendment ap-
plied to the states through the fourteenth amendment in 1925,26 it
resisted creating a constitutional privilege covering defamatory state-
ments by the media. The Court recognized a strong legitimate state
interest in protecting the reputations of its citizens27 and upheld the
constitutionality of state libel laws imposing strict liability for defam-
atory falsehoods. The Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire28  stated that libelous statements have never been thought to
raise constitutional problems. The Court found that "it has been
well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any expo-
sition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality. '2  The Court held this
view until 1964 when it created a constitutional privilege for media
defendants in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. °
B. The Modern Approach: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan
The Court in New York Times established a constitutional priv-
ilege protecting media defendants in cases involving allegedly defam-
atory published statements regarding the official conduct of public
25. Recognized privileges are divided into two categories: conditional and absolute. Con-
ditional privileges may be overcome by proving actual malice as defined in New York Times, or
traditional malice, defined as ill-will. Conditional privileges protect: defendants in libel cases in
which the plaintiff is a public figure; statements made to protect the speaker's own legitimate
interests; statements made from a moral or legal obligation to inform a third party about facts
detrimental to the third party's legitimate interests; statements made by one with a legitimate
interest in the subject matter to others with a common interest in the subject; statements made
to public officials soliciting their aid in a matter of public concern; and full and accurate
publication of public proceedings and meetings. Id. at 1361-62.
Another conditional privilege is fair comment. This privilege protects public comment and
criticism of persons and things of public concern. Such opinions must be based on true under-
lying facts. Id. at 1362-63.
Absolute privileges include: defamatory statements made by any of the participants injudicial and quasi-judicial proceedings; defamatory statements made by legislators and wit-
nesses in the course of legislative proceedings; and communications made by executive officials
in the course of their jobs. Id. at 1360-61.
26. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (upholding a state statute prohibit-
ing speech designed to incite anarchy).
27. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341.
28. 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (focusing on fighting words and setting forth the categorization
approach to first amendment-protected speech).
29. Id. at 571-72 (footnotes omitted).
30. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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officials."1 The Court held that under the first and fourteenth
amendments a public official may not recover damages for a defama-
tory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that
the statement was made with actual malice.8 2 The Court defined ac-
tual malice as knowledge of the falsity of the statement or reckless
disregard of whether the statement was true or false. 8
The Court based its holding on the "profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhib-
ited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may include vehement, caus-
tic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and
public officials." 8 ' The majority emphasized that the fundamental
concern was to protect first amendment rights" and quoted Justice
Brandeis' statement in Whitney v. California:"
Those who won our independence believed . . . that public dis-
cussion is a political duty; and that this should be a fundamen-
tal principle of the American government. They recognized the
risks to which all human institutions are subject. But they knew
that order cannot be secured merely through fear of punishment
for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope, and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repres-
sion breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the
path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed
grievances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy
for evil counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by the
law - the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the
occasional tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the
constitution so that free speech and assembly should be
guaranteed .3
Thus, in order to protect free and open public discussion, the first
31. Id. at 283. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg agreed with the result in the case
but stated that there should be an absolute immunity from libel suits of this kind. Id. at 293
(Black, J., concurring); id. at 298 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
32. Id. at 279-80. Precedent for this holding came from Coleman v. MacLennan, 78
Kan. 711, 98 P. 281 (1908). Coleman recognized a conditional privilege for good faith mis-
statements of fact made to the public about matters of vital public interest. See Eaton, supra
note 1, at 1362, 1366-67.
33. 267 U.S. at 280. The Court established "clear and convincing" evidence as the req-
uisite standard of proof for finding actual malice, a much higher standard than a "preponder-
ance" of the evidence. Id. at 285-86.
34. Id. at 270.
35. Id. at 269-79.
36. 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (upholding a state criminal syndical-
ism statute).
37. 376 U.S. at 270 (quoting Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377).
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amendment protects some published statements which are
erroneous.
8
With the new constitutional privilege, the courts imposed the
actual malice standard in place of the strict liability standard. The
plaintiff now had a heavier burden of proof to bear. The free press,
on the other hand, no longer had the burden of proving that all the
particulars of an alleged defamatory statement were true.3 9 The
Court had feared that the cost of litigation and the difficulties of
proving the truth of the statement would deter the would-be critic
from making controversial statements.'0 In this way, the free ex-
change of ideas which is protected by the first amendment could be
repressed."1 The Court designed the constitutional privilege to allevi-
ate the chilling effects of this burden and to guarantee first amend-
ment freedoms."2
Subsequently the Court extended the actual malice standard to
cases involving public figure plaintiffs. 8 Eventually the Court
adopted a two-tiered approach to media libel cases in Gertz v. Rob-
ert Welch, Inc." In Gertz the majority held that the actual malice
standard applied to public figures, but for private figure plaintiffs
the states were free to adopt negligence as a minimum standard of
liability.'8 The Court in Gertz based its decision on the rationale
that private parties are more vulnerable to harm from defamatory
falsehoods than public figures. 4' Because of this increased vulnerabil-
ity, the Court found that preserving the first amendment values of
38. 376 U.S. at 270-73.
39. Id. at 279.
40. Id. at 278-79.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 279.
43. Curtis Publishing, 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
44. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
45. Id. at 347. The Court in Gertz defined a public figure as one who has achieved such
general fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure in all contexts, or one who volunta-
rily thrusts himself into a particular public controversy. Id. at 345. The public/private figure
distinction has caused numerous difficulties because of the lack of a clear distinction between
the two categories of plaintiffs. Unfortunately the problems resulting from the distinction are
beyond the scope of this comment. For several excellent discussions of these problems, see
Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. REV. 422 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Anderson]; Ashdown, Gertz and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Making, 61
MINN. L. REV. 645 (1977); Del Russo, Freedom of the Press and Defamation: Attacking the
Bastion of New York Times v. Sullivan, 25 ST. Louis U.L.J. 501 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
Del Russo].
46. The Court reasoned that private figures lack the access to the media that public
figures supposedly have and that such access may be needed to combat such falsehoods. Gertz,
418 U.S. at 343-46.
1986]
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free speech and free press had to yield to the state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens."7
Prior to Gertz, the Court in St. Amant v. Thompson"' explicitly
defined actual malice as a subjective standard in order to protect the
exercise of first amendment rights."' The St. Amant Court found
that the public's right to be informed about public business and the
conduct of public officials is so essential that the defense of truth
would not adequately protect against self-censorship by the press.50
Similarly, a standard of ordinary care would not adequately protect
first amendment rights.51 Thus, to ensure that the truth about public
affairs is vigorously investigated and published, the Court concluded
that the first amendment had to protect some erroneous published
statements as well as true ones.
5 2
In 1979, the Supreme Court in Herbert v. Lando5' examined
47. Id.
48. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
49. Id. at 731-32. A subjective standard gives more protection to the defendant because
the plaintiff must in this situation show that the defendant was actually aware of the falsity of
the statement, rather than merely show what a reasonable person should have known.
50. Id. at 731.
51. Id. at 731-32.
52. Id. at 732.
53. 441 U.S. 153 (1979). Plaintiff Herbert was a retired Army officer who served for a
long period in Vietnam. In 1969-70, he attracted widespread media attention when he accused
his superiors of covering up war crimes and other "atrocities." In 1973, co-defendant CBS
broadcast a television program on Herbert and his accusations. Defendant Lando produced the
show and later wrote a magazine article that was published in Atlantic Monthly magazine.
Herbert then sued Lando, commentator Mike Wallace, CBS, and the Atlantic Monthly for
defamation. Herbert alleged that the program and the article "falsely and maliciously por-
trayed him as a liar and a person who made war-crime charges to explain his relief from
command." Id. at 156.
During pretrial discovery, Herbert deposed Lando for over a year. The deposition filled
twenty-six volumes. It was nearly 3,000 pages long and contained 240 exhibits. Plaintiff ad-
mitted that he was a public figure. Id. at 157, n.2 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 566 F.2d 974,
983 (2d Cir. 1977)).
The inquiries to which Lando objected were as follows:
1. Lando's conclusions during his research and investigations regarding people
or leads to be pursued, or not to be pursued, in connection with the "60 Min-
utes" segment and the Atlantic Monthly article;
2. Lando's conclusions about facts imparted by interviewees and his state of
mind with respect to the veracity of persons interviewed;
3. The basis for conclusions where Lando testified that he did reach a conclu-
sion concerning the veracity of persons, information or events;
4. Conversations between Lando and Wallace about matters to be included or
excluded from the broadcast publication; and
5. Lando's intentions as manifested by his decision to include or exclude certain
material.
Id. at 157, n.2 (quoting Herbert v. Lando, 568 F.2d 974, 982 (2d. Cir. 1977)).
The District Court directed Lando to respond to the questions pursuant to a FED. R. Civ.
DISCOVERY IN MEDIA LIBEL
the subjective nature of the actual malice standard. In doing so, how-
ever, the Court moved away from the Court's concerns in New York
Times. The Court in Herbert held that there is no absolute privilege
that protects the editorial process54 of a media defendant in a libel
case." Under this rule, a defendant in a libel suit who participates
in the editorial process must answer discovery questions about his
state of mind during the editorial process. The extent of discovery
into the defendant's state of mind is limited only by the standards of
relevance in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."'
The Court found that because actual malice is a subjective stan-
dard,57 the plaintiff must be able to inquire into the defendant's state
of mind to find out whether the defendant actually doubted the truth
of the statement when he published it." According to the Herbert
Court, the judiciary has traditionally permitted discovery of any evi-
dence relevant to the defendant's state of mind in order to defeat a
conditional privilege." The majority further asserted that state
courts have long admitted evidence about the media's editorial pro-
cess without encountering constitutional objections." In addition, the
Court concluded that Gertz did not provide any constitutional discov-
ery privilege nor indicate any intent to narrow the scope of discovery
available to a libel plaintiff.'
The Court finally determined that the actual malice standard
was difficult to meet, and that it therefore put a heavy burden on the
plaintiff. If the media claimed an absolute privilege, this would un-
reasonably limit the plaintiff to objective proof, from which a jury
could only infer actual malice." To ease this burden, the Court
stated that the plaintiff should have the right to investigate the be-
P. 37(a) discovery request. 73 F.R.D. 387. 394 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 568 F.2d 974, 983-84 (2d
Cir. 1977), rev'd., 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979). The court of appeals reversed the district court
order on the grounds that such discovery was an impermissible intrusion into the editorial
process and would cause an intolerable chilling effect on the media's exercise of its first amend-
ment rights. 568 F.2d at 983, rev'd, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
54. See supra notes 17 & 25.
55. 441 U.S. at 169.
56. Id. at 169-77.
57. See St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731-32.
58. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160.
59. Id. at 165. It should be noted, however, that the malice that traditionally overcomes
a conditional privilege is described as ill-will, not as the Court defined the term in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 201 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
60. 441 U.S. at 165.
61. Id. at 168. A constitutional privilege could be, for example, a privilege protecting
the editorial process from discovery in a public figure libel suit. See infra notes 82-86 and
accompanying text.
62. 441 U.S. at 170
19861
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liefs, thoughts, and knowledge of the defendant.6"
In Herbert v. Lando, the Supreme Court balanced first amend-
ment rights with discovery principles"4 because of concern for the
plaintiff's heavy burden of proof." The Court considered the safe-
guards protecting free press to be a discovery issue, and found these
safeguards to be an obstacle to the plaintiff's discovery of the truth.
The Court concluded that first amendment safeguards must yield in
such circumstances." Thus Herbert chipped away the constitutional
privilege for media defendants.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT STANDARDS OF STATE
OF MIND DISCOVERY: THE ACTUAL MALICE STANDARD CHILLS
THE EDITORIAL PROCESS
The Supreme Court adopted the standard of actual malice in
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 7 to protect the media first amend-
ment guarantees of free speech and free press."' To further protect
media defendants, the Court later defined actual malice as a subjec-
tive standard of proof." This standard required the plaintiff to prove
the defendant's actual state of mind, a heavier burden, in order to
establish actual malice.
7 0
In Herbert"' however, the Supreme Court used the actual mal-
ice standard to ease the public figure plaintiff's burden of proof.
72
The Court eased this burden by allowing a plaintiff to depose the
media defendant about his state of mind7' during the editorial pro-
cess.74 Such information is important because the actual malice stan-
dard focuses on whether "the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts to the truth of his publication. '7 5 Since the defendant's actual
63. Id.
64. Id. at 175 & n.24.
65. Id. at 170.
66. Id. at 175. The Court compared the proposed editorial privilege in Herbert with the
absolute executive privileges in U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), in order to show that even
constitutionally based claims of privilege will not be favored in the face of "a demonstrated
specific need for evidence." Herbert, 441 U.S. at 175.
67. See supra notes 30-40 and accompanying text.
68. 376 U.S. at 279.
69. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
70. Id. at 731-32.
71. See supra notes 53-66 and accompanying text.
72. 441 U.S. at 169-72.
73. See supra note 16.
74. 441 U.S. at 169, 175. See supra note 53 (for types of questions to which defendant
Lando objected).
75. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
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knowledge or belief is the key issue, the Court found that it was
appropriate to allow inquiry into the defendant's state of mind dur-
ing the editorial process." According to the Court, objective proof of
actual malice 7 did not sufficiently allow the plaintiff to overcome the
heavy burden of proving actual malice.7 1
In reaching its decision, the Court in Herbert focused on a
number of factors. First, it noted that courts have traditionally ad-
mitted relevant state of mind evidence that is necessary to overcome a
conditional privilege or to enhance damages.7 9 Such rules of evidence
are applicable to both media and non-media defendants, and as the
Court pointed out, there were no constitutional objections to such
rules.80 The Court seemed surprised that the defendant was ob-jecting to such questioning, especially since the defendant admitted
that the questions he objected to were the easiest to answer.8"
A second factor that the Court emphasized was that there was
no hint of an absolute editorial discovery privilege in either of the
two Supreme Court cases that the Herbert court of appeals cited in
its opinion. The two cases, Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
Tornillo8 2 and CBS v. Democratic National Comm.," taken to-
gether stand only for the proposition that neither a state nor the fed-
eral government may dictate what must or must not be printed.8 '
Furthermore, the Tornillo and Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8" cases
were released the same day, and although Gertz contained a survey
of recent developments regarding the tension between the first
76. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160, 172.
77. Objective proof of actual malice could consist of evidence that would undercut the
defendant's claims of a good faith belief in the truth of the statement. This could be done by
presenting such claims as so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have pub-
lished them. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 732.
A plaintiff could also objectively prove actual malice by providing obvious reasons to
doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of the report. Id. See also Herbert, 441
U.S. at 210 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (providing additional examples of objective proof of
actual malice).
78. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 172.
79. Id. at 165.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 172 & n.20. The defendant stated that "Itihey are set-up questions for our
side. . . . [Tihese are not difficult questions to answer." Id..
82. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) ("[G]overnment compulsion on a newspaper to publish that
which reason tells it should not be published is unconstitutional." Id. at 241).
83. 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters not required to accept paid editorial
advertisements).
84. This is the Herbert Court's interpretation of the two cases. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 168
n.16 (citing Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 255-56).
85. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
1986]
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amendment and the policies supporting libel law, it did not indicate
that "a companion case had narrowed the evidence available to a
defamation plaintiff."86 Therefore, one major reason the Herbert
Court rejected the proposed privilege is that it went too far without
being supported by judicial authority.
The most important reason that the Court refused to uphold the
privilege was that it placed too great an evidentiary burden on the
plaintiff to show actual malice."7 Given the subjective nature of the
actual malice standard88 and the requirement in New York Times
that libel plaintiffs prove knowing or reckless falsehoods with "con-
vincing clarity," 9 the Court determined that a libel plaintiff already
faces a substantial evidentiary burden.90 Consequently, closing off
direct evidence through inquiry into the publisher's thoughts, opin-
ions, and conclusions regarding the defendant's alleged reckless dis-
regard of the truth would erect too high a barrier for the plaintiff to
overcome.9" The privilege would have meant that a plaintiff could
only introduce objective evidence of actual malice, and the Court de-
termined that such evidence would not be nearly as effective for the
plaintiff as direct evidence obtained through state of mind
discovery."
Courts in subsequent cases have echoed the concern that an ab-
solute privilege would increase the plaintiff's burden in a manner
inconsistent with New York Times and its progeny. 93 These courts,
along with the Herbert Court, have rejected the argument that such
discovery would induce a chilling effect on the publisher's exercise of
first amendment rights. The courts have concluded that the actual
malice standard itself provides sufficient room for error for the press.
As the Supreme Court stated in Calder v. Jones, "the potential chill
86. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 168.
87. Id. at 169-77.
88. St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731-32.
89. 376 U.S. at 285-86.
90. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 174.
91. Id. at 170.
92. Id. See also Westmoreland v. CBS, 97 F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Al-
though it is true that plaintiff can acquire certain relevant information by other forms of dis-
covery, there are important relevant issues on which the Benjamin Report is the best, if not the
only available source." Id.). See infra note 120 for the facts of Westmoreland.
93. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 169. See Calder v. Jones, 104 S. Ct. 1482, 1488 (1984);
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 821 (1982); Steaks Unlimited v. Deaner, 623 F.2d 264,
279 (3d Cir. 1980); Miller v. Transamerican Press, Inc., 621 F.2d 721 (5th Cir. 1980); U.S.
ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags, Inc., 600 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Westmoreland v. CBS, 97
F.R.D. 703, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Mitchell v. Superior Court, 37 Cal. 3d 268, 278-79, 208
Cal. Rptr. 152, 158-59, 690 P.2d 625, 631-32 (1984).
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on protected first amendment activity stemming from libel and defa-
mation actions is already taken into account in the constitutional
limitations on the substantive law governing such suits.""' The dis-
trict court in Sharon v. Time, Inc.9" stated that "the Supreme Court
[in New York Times] has already weighed all the considerations...
and has chosen alternative means [the actual malice standard] for
protecting the strong interest in encouraging publication of views re-
lating to official conduct."" Thus, according to the Court in Herbert
and the other cases, the actual malice standard renders any addi-
tional constitutional protection unnecessary.
To a point, the various courts' reasoning on this point is logical.
Because of the subjective nature of the actual malice standard it
seems reasonable that the plaintiff should be able to inquire into the
thoughts, beliefs, knowledge, and conclusions of the publisher. Per-
mitting such discovery with only the relevance limitation to act as a
protection, however, is another matter.
Allowing unlimited discovery into the editorial process and the
state of mind of the media defendant creates serious problems. First,
the holding in Herbert fails to acknowledge the importance of objec-
tive proof in proving actual malice." When the St. Amant Court
defined actual malice as, a subjective standard, it warned that a de-
fendant's claims of good faith belief in the truth of the statement
would not automatically ensure a "favorable verdict." The St.
Amant Court required objective proof of the defendant's good faith
belief by stating:
The finder of fact must determine whether the publication was
indeed made in good faith. Professions of good faith will be un-
likely to prove persuasive . . . where a story is fabricated by the
defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly
on an unverified anonymous telephone call. Nor will they be
likely to prevail when the publisher's allegations are so inher-
94. 104 S. Ct. at 1488.
95. 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
96. Id. at 554.
97. The Herbert Court explained:
[T]he defendant's reckless disregard of the truth, a critical element, could not be
shown by direct inquiry into the thoughts, opinions, and conclusions of the pub-
lisher, but could be proved only by objective evidence from which the ultimate
fact could be inferred. . . .To erect an impenetrable barrier to the plaintiff's
use of such evidence on his side of the case is a matter of some substance, partic-
ularly when defendants themselves are prone to assert their good faith belief in
the truth of their publications, and libel plaintiffs are required to prove knowing
or reckless falsehood with "convincing clarity."
441 U.S. at 170.
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ently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them
in circulation. Likewise, recklessness may be found where there
are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or
the accuracy of his reports. 8
Objective evidence therefore either substantiates or refutes the de-
fendant's stated subjective belief. Without objective evidence, there is
no way to show a defendant's good faith belief in the truth of a
statement. Objective proof is important because it illustrates the de-
fendant's subjective intent in publishing the statement. Therefore ob-
jective proof makes a subjective standard possible. By placing so little
reliance on the need for objective evidence, the Herbert Court put too
much emphasis on the use of subjective evidence to prove actual mal-
ice."9 Because of this misplaced emphasis, the Court implicitly ap-
proved a broader scope of discovery into the defendant's state of
mind than is really required. This wide scope is the major flaw in
the Court's holding in Herbert.
Herbert applies to cases using the actual malice standard.
Under Herbert, a plaintiff's discovery into the media's editorial pro-
cess is limited only by the trial judge's firm application of the rele-
vance standards set forth in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
0 °
The policy behind the evidentiary rules concerning discovery is to
allow the parties to have access to all direct or indirect relevant evi-
dence.1 0 ' The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that discov-
ery rules are to be given "a broad and liberal treatment"'0 2 and scof-
fed at the argument that such treatment results in a "fishing
expedition.' 10 8
However, because of the constitutional values at stake in media
libel cases, normal discovery policy should not apply in such situa-
tions. 10 ' Determining the scope of discovery available to the plaintiff
98. 390 U.S. at 732 (emphasis added).
99. 441 U.S. at 170.
100. Id. at 177. State statutes setting forth relevance standards apply when the state sets
the standard of proof in libel- cases.
101. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 114-15, 117 (1964); Hickman v. Tay-
lor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507 (1947).
102. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177; Schlagenhauf, 379 U.S. at 114-15; Hickman, 329 U.S.
at 507.
103. Hickman, 329 U.S. at 507.
104. Such constitutional values include the media's first amendment rights. These rights
will not always prevail over other considerations which may consist of opposing constitutional
considerations. For example, newspeople do not have a first amendment privilege to withhold
relevant facts in a grand jury criminal investigation even if those facts include the identity of
confidential sources. For such a situation, the first amendment interests are outweighed by the
duty to appear before a grand jury and the duty to answer questions relevant to a criminal
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is an especially important task which requires consistent application,
especially when a media defendant is involved. Consistent applica-
tion of discovery rules is essential because it gives notice to the media
in general, and the publisher in particular, of what communications
may be excluded from discovery. The result is that the media is able
to exercise its constitutional rights more freely105 because the media
has a better idea of what communications or information may be
protected."'
Consistency under the current guidelines, however, is elusive.
This is because the Herbert Court failed to provide guidelines re-
garding state of mind discovery other than a demand for firm appli-
cation of the relevance requirement in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' The Court provided no further guidance despite its
prior recognition of concern about potential discovery abuse.' 8 This
is illogical. If the Court believed that the relevance standard did not
prevent discovery abuses ten years ago, 09 it is questionable as to
why it would now condone the standard without effective changes.
Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 (b)(1) was amended in
1983 to allow the court to limit discovery when the discovery is "un-
duly burdensome" after examining "the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation,"' 10 courts continued to consider Herbert as
controlling authority."' Therefore, relevance is not an effective limit
on the scope of discovery available in public figure-media libel cases.
The current broad scope of the discovery rules has resulted in
several chilling effects on the editorial policy, and decision-making
potentially suffers because editorial discussions are subject to admis-
sion in court. Several courts, however, including the Herbert Court,
investigation. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 679-709 (1972).
105. For example, publishers and editors could pursue and discuss controversial stories
with confidence that such information would not be used against them in court where confir-
mation of the facts may be difficult to obtain. Specifically, editors and reporters would be ableto know the extent to which they could discuss information potentially embarrassing to a po-tential plaintiff without later having to disclose the difficulties in obtaining confirmation of the
statement. See infra text accompanying notes 137-43.
106. Guidelines are developing regarding the privilege a newsman may have to protect
confidential sources in civil actions. For an excellent discussion of the question of news privi-leges, see Comment, California's "New" Newsmen's Shield Law and the Criminal Defend-
ant's Right to a Fair Trial, 26 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 219 (1986). [hereinafter cited as
Comment].
107. 441 U.S. at 177.
108. Id. at 176-77 n.26.
109. Id.
110. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(i)-(iii).
111. See Calder, 104 S. Ct. at 1488; Westmoreland, 97 F.R.D. at 706; Mitchell, 37Cal. 3d at 277-79, 690 P.2d at 629-31, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 157-58.
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have claimed that the actual malice standard creates the needed
breathing space for the media to exercise its constitutional rights,
and that the only chilling effect on the editorial process will be to
deter false or reckless publication."' This argument, while recogniz-
ing the difficulties often encountered in separating fact from reckless
falsehoods, 1 ' ignores the effect of subjecting the editorial process to
literally unrestricted discovery. Because the exposure of prepublica-
tion discussions can be very damaging, editors, reporters, and pub-
lishers may not confer as much or as thoroughly about a story. This
could create a vicious circle: the chilling effect on the decision-mak-
ing process could cause a decline in the quality of the editorial pro-
cess. Presumably there would be less investigation and less accurate
publishing which would therefore lead to more libel litigation. In
addition, with less accurate publishing, the quality and quantity of
public debate declines.1 4
Another chilling effect on the editorial process is the increased
cost of litigation as a result of essentially unlimited discovery rules.
Publishers must be concerned about the costs of defending libel
suits.1"8 In 1971, Metromedia spent almost $100,000 defending the
libel action in the Rosenbloom case. 1 Undoubtedly defense costs are
higher today. 117 In addition to the high financial costs, defending a
libel suit wastes much of a defendant's time. In Herbert, it took over
a year to take the defendant's deposition, and Lando and his associ-
ates "were diverted from newsgathering and reporting for a signifi-
cant amount of time." ' 8
As a result of the litigation costs, a wealthy plaintiff or a plain-
tiff with strong support from legal or financial circles may be able to
dictate future media coverage of him by threatening litigation."
Such a plaintiff may have the financial resources to tie up the media
defendant in lengthy litigation. Libel plaintiffs often do not sue to
recover damages but to vindicate their names. Many times, such
112. See supra text accompanying notes 94-96.
113. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 171-73.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 34-42.
115. Del Russo, supra note 45, at 520. See also Anderson, supra note 45, at 436 n.45
(citing THE AssoU:IATED PRESS, THE DANGERS OF LIBEL 1 (1964) as an example of press
self-censorship to avoid high litigation costs).
116. Anderson, supra note 45, at 436.
117. More recently, ABC supposedly spent $7 million to defend a libel suit and CBS
spent at least $3 million in the pretrial phase of another suit. E. PELL, THE BIG CHILL 162
(1984) [hereinafter cited as PELL].
118. 441 U.S. at 176 n.25.
119. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 204 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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plaintiffs feel they have been wronged in the eyes of the community
and that a lawsuit is a proper means of vindicating their
reputation. 120
The threat of huge damage awards could chill future public de-
bate on controversial issues. This reaction could be especially recur-
rent in emotionally charged issues such as the Vietnam War. For
instance, in the Westmoreland case, the supporters and opponents of
the war chose sides in the Westmoreland litigation."' Although pub-
lic discussion on the subject may be active during litigation, the me-
dia will be more careful with regards to what they publish about the
plaintiff in the future, and public debate will be chilled. The finan-
cial costs of litigation may also drive many small newspapers, radio,
or television stations out of business as such costs would be
prohibitive.1 22
120. Del Russo, supra note 45, at 520 (footnote omitted). See also D. KOWET, A MAT-
TER OF HONOR 68, 164-67, 224-26, 229-39 (1984) [hereinafter cited as KOWET]. Westmore-
land was a good example of a plaintiff going to court to vindicate his reputation. See KOWET,
at 229-39.
In Westmoreland, defendant CBS broadcast a television news documentary which stated
that plaintiff Westinoreland, the former commander of the U.S. forces in Vietnam, engineered
a conspiracy in the months before the Tet offensive in 1968 to suppress intelligence reports of
a growing number of enemy troops in order to show progress in the war to the American
public and to the White House. Westmoreland had support from both legal and financial
circles. Id. at 224-26. The $120 million in damages requested by General Westmoreland is an
astronomical sum. Jd.at 228-29. Because of his support, even though Westmoreland settled his
suit, publishers will consider their financial costs when they decide on what they publish about
General Westmoreland and other controversial figures in the future.
As Ariel Sharon, another recent libel plaintiff, said after the jury found that Time Maga-
zine had published a defamatory statement describing him as having encouraged the 1982
Palestinian refugee massacre, "I feel we have achieved what had brought us here to this coun-
try. . . . We came here to prove that Time Magazine lied . . . [a]nd we managed to prove
that Time Magazine lied." Time Cleared of Libeling Sharon But Jurors Criticize Its Report-
ing, N.Y. Times, Jan 25, 1985, at 1. Sharon was satisfied with this "vindication" of his repu-
tation even though the jury did not find actual malice.
The Supreme Court noted the plaintiff's concern for his reputation and how this concern
could be addressed. The Court concluded that there could be separate verdicts on the truth or
falsity of the statement and actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 105 S.
Ct. 2939, 2950 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
121. KOWET, supra note 120, at 158-69, 224-26, 231-32. If General Westmoreland had
won his case, or if another controversial figure wins a future case, the intimidation that the
media may feel could signal a return to pre-New York Times standards in which a public
official could dictate public comment on his official conduct. This was a major problem that the
Court was trying to solve in New York Times. See supra text accompanying notes 31-38.
Here, instead of state libel laws producing the chilling effect through strict liability, the
high cost of litigation and the broad definition of relevance available to the court to compel
state of mind discovery cause the chilling effect.
122. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 204 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See also PELL, supra note
117, at 164-67 (recognizing the effects of threatened libel litigation on small publishers and the
inadequacy of liability insurance to cover punitive damages).
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Consequently, the Court's holding in Herbert repudiates the
spirit, policy, and effect of New York Times by inducing a chilling
effect on the media's exercise of its first amendment rights, a chilling
effect that the New York Times Court sought to avoid. The Court in
Herbert used the actual malice standard to create a new balance in
the tension between the first amendment values of free speech and
press and the states' interest in protecting their citizens' reputations.
However, this new balance is weighted too heavily in favor of
plaintiffs at the expense of constitutional values. It is necessary to tip
the balance, and thus lessen the judicial leeway regarding pretrial
discovery that produces a potentially chilling effect on the media.
This current imbalance is not necessary because the competing inter-
ests can be balanced without sacrificing consistent and substantial
constitutional protection.
IV. PROPOSALS
A. Re-emphasize Objective Proof of Actual Malice
When the Herbert court underestimated the importance of ob-
jective evidence to prove actual malice,1 23 it placed too much reliance
on subjective evidence through state of mind discovery. Unrestricted
state of mind discovery inhibits the editorial process because it poten-
tially provides very damaging evidence against a media defendant at
trial. 1 2
4
A subjective standard, however, cannot exist without objective
proof. Objective proof is the mechanism by which a defendant's good
faith claims are measured. It would be unfair to the plaintiff if the
defendant could prevail merely by claiming a good faith belief that
the published statement was true. Therefore, in order to maintain a
reasonable balance between plaintiffs' and defendants' interests, trial
judges should emphasize the use of objective evidence to prove actual
malice in libel cases involving the actual malice standard.
Reliance upon objective proof to authenticate the defendant's
actual malice is not a new idea. The Court in St. Amant called for
objective proof to verify defendants' claims of good faith," 5 and
courts at both state and federal levels have authorized such use of
objective evidence.1 2 6 Actual malice can be proven through several
123. 441 U.S. at 172. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
125. 390 U.S. at 732.
126. See Herbert, 441 U.S. at 160; Ryan v. Brooks, 634 F.2d 726, 732 (4th Cir. 1980);
U.S. v. Davis, 617 F.2d 677, 694 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp.
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methods, such as "absence of verification, inherent implausibility,
obvious reasons to doubt the veracity or accuracy of information, and
concessions or inconsistent statements by the defendant.' 127
Judicial preference for objective or alternative sources of proof
of actual malice is occurring in similar pretrial settings involving the
protection of a reporter's, editor's, or publisher's confidential
sources." 8 In the California case of Mitchell v. Superior Court129
for example, one of the factors that the court took into account in
fashioning such a newsman's privilege and deciding when the privi-
lege should apply was whether the plaintiff had exhausted all alter-
native sources of obtaining the relevant information.'" 0 The court
considered this factor, along with others, in order to determine when
to apply the privilege."' The reason for considering these functions
was to find an appropriate balance between the first amendment val-
ues protecting against compelled disclosure of the identity of a source
(protection against interference with a reporter's newsgathering abil-
ity),' 2 and those policies favoring disclosure (protecting the individ-
ual's interest in his reputation by making it easier for the plaintiff to
prove actual malice).' 83
Similarly, a trial court's emphasis on objective proof of actual
malice will serve the competing interests mentioned above. By not
overemphasizing the need to examine the defendant's state of mind,
the proposal would ease the plaintiff's heavy burden of proof in me-
dia libel cases, thereby addressing the concern of the Herbert
1000, 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 1363,
1366 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Hansen v. Stoll, 130 Ariz. 454, 458, 636 P.2d 1236, 1240 (1981).
127. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 210 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted). See also
Anderson, supra note 45, at 456 n.173 (use of objective proof to show actual malice).
128. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 282, 690 P.2d at 714-15, 208 Cal Rptr. at 161; Baker v. F
& F Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 784 (2nd Cir. 1972); Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F.
Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976); Senear v. Daily Journal-American, 97 Wash. 2d 148, 151,
641 P. 2d 1180, 1183 (1982); KSDO v. Superior Court, 136 Cal. App. 3d 375, 385, 186 Cal.
Rptr. 211, 216-18 (1982).
129. 37 Cal. 3d 268, 690 P.2d 625, 208 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1984). Mitchell involved a libel
dispute between plaintiff Synanon and Davis Mitchell, publisher of the Point Reyes Light.
130. Id. at 282, 690 P.2d at 634, 280 Cal. Rptr. at 161.
131. The other factors that the court considered were: first, the nature of the litigation
and whether the reporter is a party to it; second, the relevance of the requested information to
plaintiff's cause of action; third, whether a prima facie showing that the alleged defamatory
statements are false has been made. Id. at 279-83, 690 P.2d at 632-34, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 159-
61. For a more complete discussion of these factors, see Comment, supra note 106.
132. Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 274-75, 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155 (quoting
Zerilli v. Smith, 656 F.2d 705, 710-11 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
133. Id.
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Court."" This proposal would also protect constitutional values by
limiting the importance that the Herbert Court placed on subjective
evidence. 85 Therefore, courts and plaintiffs would not have to rely
as much on state of mind discovery. Also, re-emphasizing objective
proof would lessen the chilling effect on the editorial process in two
ways: first, editorial decision-making and prepublication discussions
would be less inhibited since the individuals would know that the
actual conversations would not be admissible as evidence; second, the
time and financial costs of litigation would decrease for both parties.
As a result, deep pocket plaintiffs " ' would not be as great a threat
to libel defendants because the lower litigation costs would reduce
their economic leverage.
Thus, there is no need to rely as heavily on subjective evidence
of the defendant's state of mind in libel cases. Other methods are
available to prove actual malice and should be used in order to pro-
tect the media without sacrificing the states' interest in protecting
their citizens' reputations.
B. Allow a Limited Discovery Privilege for the Editorial Process
In order to prevent the chilling effect caused by largely un-
restricted state of mind discovery, 3 7 a limited discovery privilege for
the editorial process should be created. This privilege should encom-
pass all prepublication conversations by those involved in publishing
the statement. Justice Marshall called for this type of privilege in his
dissenting opinion in Herbert"3 8 and it should be established now.
Under such a privilege, plaintiffs would not be entitled to in-
quire into the content of the prepublication discussions of reporters,
editors, publishers, or others involved in the editorial process.1 9 Oth-
erwise, discovery proceedings in media liable cases would be gov-
134. 441 U.S. at 170, 174, 176.
135. Id. at 170.
136. See supra text accompanying note 119 for a definition of a deep pocket plaintiff in
a defamation context.
137. Under Herbert, state of mind discovery is only subject to the trial judge's firm
application of the relevance standards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 441 U.S. at
177.
138. Id. at 202-10 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's privilege, similar to the
one in this proposal, would protect prepublication editorial discussion from discovery by any
defamation plaintiff. This comment's proposal would limit the privilege to cases in which the
actual malice standard applies, since the defendant's state of mind is not as crucial in cases
using negligence as the applicable standard of liability.
139. Plaintiffs could, however, ask whether such conversations took place in order to
show objective evidence of actual malice. The defendant's failure to discuss the story before its
publication is one example of using objective means to prove actual malice.
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erned by the normal discovery procedures under the state and federal
rules of civil procedure. 140
This privilege would allow writers, editors, and publishers to
discuss their opinions and doubts about certain publications or to
experiment with the presentation of such information without fear of
public disclosure of their remarks.1 41 As Justice Marshall stated in
his dissenting opinion, "[tihose who expect public dissemination of
their remarks may well temper candor with a concern for appear-
ances . . . to the detriment of the decision-making process."'142 The
freedom from such exposure would encourage those involved in the
editorial process to exchange their ideas more freely. It would also
encourage public debate on a wider range of issues; this is consistent
with the ideals of an open society and was a goal that the New York
Times Court recognized. 8
The privilege should be limited to prepublication discussions for
two reasons. First, an absolute discovery privilege for the editorial
process would provide no check on irresponsible journalism. An ab-
solute privilege could expose citizens to unjustified attacks on their
reputations without providing those injured with adequate legal re-
course because of the plaintiff's increased burden of showing actual
malice. This conflicts with the legitimate state interest in protecting
its citizens' reputations from unjustified attacks.144
Second, a limited editorial privilege is desirable because the ac-
tual malice standard is a subjective standard of proof. Although ob-
jective evidence should be used by plaintiffs whenever possible to
prove actual malice, the plaintiff must focus on the defendant's state
of mind to some extent. Thus, during discovery a plaintiff should be
entitled to inquire into the beliefs, opinion, or conclusions of the de-
140. It is possible to see the analogy between the situation in Herbert and a situation
involving a reporter faced with the compelled disclosure of a confidential source. The policy
supporting some degree of privilege against such disclosure is similar to that supporting a
limited privilege encompassing prepublication editorial discussions. Just as compelling a re-
porter to disclose the identity of a source may significantly interfere with his newsgathering
ability, Mitchell, 37 Cal. 3d at 275, 690 P.2d at 628, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 155, requiring those
involved in the editorial process to disclose their prepublication discussions will hamper their
ability to freely sort through the facts they have and to decide how and what should be pub-
lished. See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text. In both situations there is a need for
candor and a free flow of information. Palandjian v. Pahlavi, 11 MEDIA L. REP. (BNA 1028,
1030 (D.D.C. 1984)).
141. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142. d. at 209 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705
(1974)).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
338 U.S. 130 (1967) (extension of actual malice standard to public figures).
144. Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 86 (1966).
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fendant in order to obtain evidence of actual malice. The Court's
holding in Herbert does not "chill" a reporter's or editor's thought
processes. A reporter's or editor's brain does not cease to function
because their thoughts may be subject to discovery. Reporters and
editors continue to form opinions and conclusions about what they
publish.1 45 What is chilled, however, is prepublication discussion
among reporters, editors, and others involved in the editorial deci-
sion-making process. That is what the proposal for an editorial com-
munication privilege seeks to remedy.
Application of the privilege to the facts in Herbert shows how
the privilege would serve the competing interests. A look at the ques-
tions that the defendant objected to in Herbert46 reveals that only
one of the five objectionable questions involved in that case (the con-
versations between Lando and Mike Wallace) would be protected by
the privilege. The remaining four questions all focused on the de-
fendant's state of mind outside of any prepublication deliberative dis-
cussions. Therefore the plaintiff could justifiably directly inquire
about such matters during discovery. 
1 4
The proposal for an editorial privilege covering prepublication
discussions is intended to provide guidelines to discovery in media
libel cases using the actual malice standard. These guidelines will
help preserve the media's exercise of its first amendment rights. At
the same time, the privilege is limited enough to preserve the states'
interest in protecting their citizens. As a result, the proposals prop-
erly balance the competing interests present in media libel cases.
145. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 207 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
146. See supra note 53.
147. See supra note 53 for the applicable questions. The fifth question, concerning
Lando's intentions, may also be protected since it may be irrelevant at to whether Lando acted
with reckless disregard for the truth. The New York Times definition of actual malice does not
involve ill will or motive, the traditional definitions of malice, but involves reckless disregard
for truth. Therefore, information regarding the defendant's intentions could be irrelevant and
not subject to discovery. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 199-201 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
A further question to consider is whether a media defendant can waive this privilege.
This question is pertinent since a defendant may choose to present evidence of good faith belief
in the truth of the publication at the outset of discovery. Herbert, 441 U.S. at 173 n.21.
Therefore, for the purpose of this particular publication, a defendant who presents direct
evidence of prepublication discussions before the plaintiff requests it can be said to have
waived the privilege. Just as CBS, which sought to protect a self-evaluation memo (the Benja-
min Report) during pretrial discovery in Westmoreland, could not hold out the Benjamin Re-
port to the public in order to substantiate its statements and then refuse to reveal the report on
the claim that it is a confidential internal memo meant for self-evaluation, a media libel de-
fendant should not be able to use prepublication discussions to show good faith belief and then
refuse to answer questions about those discussions. See Westmoreland v. CBS, 97 F.R.D. at
706.
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V. CONCLUSION
In 1964 the Supreme Court established actual malice as the
standard of proof in media libel cases. The New York Times'" Court
attempted to safeguard the first amendment rights of free speech and
free press. The Court sought to preserve these freedoms without sac-
rificing the valid state interest of protecting the reputations of its citi-
zens. Later decisions disturbed this balance and created obstacles to
establishing appropriate standards of proof in media libel cases. Fur-
ther problems arose when the Court in Herbert v. Lando allowed
unlimited state of mind discovery into the editorial process." 9 In do-
ing so, the Court undermined the rationale behind New York Times.
Herbert left too much room for judicial error in enforcing the rele-
vance requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
As a result, there is a need to return to the principles set forth
in New York Times in order to balance the competing state and con-
stitutional interests. This can be achieved without sacrificing first
amendment guarantees. By re-emphasizing objective proof of actual
malice and by granting a limited discovery privilege for the editorial
process, the courts can strike the balance between the states' interest
in protecting their citizens' reputations and the constitutional rights
protecting media defendants.
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